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"Common Nucleus of Operative Fact" and
Defensive Set-Off: Beyond the Gibbs Test
WILLIAM A. FLETCHER*

One of the mysteries of federal jurisdiction is the location of the outer
constitutional boundary of what we have come to call supplemental jurisdiction.
Under the influence of modem procedural rules encouraging liberal joinder of
parties and claims, the size of a permissible unit of litigation has substantially
increased in this century. In both state and federal courts the goal of these joinder
rules has been to foster procedural fairness and judicial efficiency, "to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."' But in some cases
federal courts have had difficulty in achieving that goal because of limitations on
their subject matter jurisdiction.
With the passage of the federal supplemental-jurisdiction statute in 1990,2 the
scope of supplemental jurisdiction for all federal question and some diversity
suits became as broad as Article IIV permits. How broad is that? In this

Comment, I use the example of an unrelated claim for defensive set-off to argue
that the constitutional test for supplemental jurisdiction is broader than the
"common nucleus of operative fact" test of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.4 An
analysis focused on defensive set-off is interesting for two reasons. First, while
defensive set-off is a procedural device whose use should be encouraged, the
modem Supreme Court has never addressed it, and there are some doubts about

* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law. B.A., Harvard
College, 1968; B.A., Oxford University, 1970; J.D., Yale University, 1975.
1.FED. R. Civ. P. 1.

2. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
3. U.S. CoNST. art. III.

4.383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). To those familiar with the academic literature, my conclusion
may not be a surprise. See L. TEPLY AND R. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 115-16 (1994)

("Nothing in the language of Article III explicitly requires that the scope of a 'case' or
'controversy' be defined by reference to the factual relationship between the joined claims, as
opposed to, for example, the entire relationship between the parties to an action, which may
include factually unrelated claims."); Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional
Case": ProceduralRules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction,
71 CAL. L. REv. 1399, 1463 (1983) ("[S]everal courts, including the Supreme Court, have
upheld supplemental jurisdiction in many ancillary jurisdiction cases that do not meet the
Gibbsfact relationship requirements.... Their existence undermines the conclusion that Gibbs
sets any constitutional limits on supplemental jurisdiction based upon fact relatedness of
claims."); Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute-A
Constitutionaland Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 890-91 (1992) ("Although the

Supreme Court arguably defined the constitutional 'case' limit of Article III in Gibbs, the
Court's attention in recent years has primarily focused on the statutory limits of supplemental
jurisdiction, and the Court has given very little discussion to the constitutional limits of Article
III."); Mary B. McManamon, Dispellingthe Myths of PendentandAncillaryJurisdiction:The
Ramifications of a Revised History, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 863, 932 (1989); Karen N.
Moore, The Supplemental JurisdictionStatute: An Important but ControversialSupplement
to Federal Jurisdiction, 41 EMORY L.J. 32, 39 (1992); Wendy C. Perdue, The New
Supplemental JurisdictionStatute-Flawedbut Flexible, 41 EMORY L.J. 69, 70-71 (1992);
Joan Steinman, Section 1367-Another PartyHeard From,41 EMORY L.J. 85, 87-91 (1992).

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 74:171

its legitimacy in federal courts. Second, defensive set-off provides the clearest
demonstration of why the Gibbs "common nucleus" test does not establish the
outer boundary of Article III. As all students of federal jurisdiction will
recognize, the conclusion that the Gibbs test does not control has substantial
implications for other unrelated claims and parties in federal court.
Defensive set-off is a counterclaim asserted by the defendant to reduce the size
of the plaintiff's judgment. It was available in Roman law, which allowed mutual
debts to be set off against each other.' By the early 1700s, defensive set-off was
allowed in English equity and law courts even when the claim for set-off arose out
of facts unrelated to the plaintiff s claim.' American courts followed the
English
7
practice and allowed defensive set-off in comparable circumstances.
The utility and essential fairness of defensive set-off is clear. If a plaintiff can
enforce a monetary judgment to its full extent without deducting an existing
liquidated debt or judgment owed to the defendant, he or she has a significant and
undeserved procedural advantage. As Professor Shulman noted in 1936, a
defendant who cannot assert a claim for set-off "would be ordered to pay out
monies to the plaintiff which, otherwise, would constitute most effective security
for his own claim against the plaintiff."" The rationale supporting defensive setoff is strongest in a suit by an insolvent where a defendant might not be able to
recover any of the debt owed to him by a plaintiff, but it extends to all cases
where it would be more difficult, uncertain, or expensive for a defendant to
recover from a plaintiff without the assistance of set-off.
In 1938-the same year the Federal Rules were adopted-Professor Moore
asserted that a claim for defensive set-off is an exception to the general rule

5. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 436-37 (1928).
6. For example, a 1705 English statute allowed a defensive claim for set-off in suits at law
when the plaintiff was insolvent, even when the claim arose out of events unrelated to the
plaintiff's claim. See Statutes of the Realm, 1705, 4 Ann., ch. 17, § 11 (Eng.); BASIL
MONTAGU, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF SET-OFF WITH AN APPENDIX OF CASES ARGUED AND

52-68 (1825) (discussing
the 1705 and successor English statutes). For a useful general history, see generally
McManamon, supra note 4.
7. See OLIVER L. BARBOUR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SET OFF 24-25 (1841); 2 JOSEPH
DETERMINED INTHE COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY ON THAT SUBJECT

STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND

AMERICA 656-69 (1836); THOMAS W. WATERMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SET-OFF,
RECOUPMENT, AND COUNTER-CLAIM 18 (1869).

8. Harry Shulman & Edward C. Jaegerman, Some JurisdictionalLimitations on Federal
Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 393, 414-15 (1936).

But if it is held that in an action for money, the defendant may not set off against
the plaintiff's claim a separate claim for money against the plaintiff, conscience
may be troubled a little.... Such a sacrifice may be required by the politics of
federalism, enacted in statute or the Constitution.
... But its harshness may be alleviated. The remedy for equitable set-off might
be afforded as an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in some cases.
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requiring an independent basis for jurisdiction for a permissive counterclaim.9
Beginning in 1945, a series of federal district court decisions adopted Professor
Moore's view.'0 According to the definition provided by Moore, a defensive setoff must be "liquidated or capable of liquidation," must "grow out of a contract
or judgment," and may arise out of facts extrinsic to plaintiff's claim." Modern
treatises and academic literature have generally followed Moore and this lower
court case law, though without extensive discussion. For example, the current
edition of the Moore treatise says simply, "Claims for defensive set off for a
liquidated or otherwise ascertained amount which are pleaded solely to diminish
or reduce ajudgment for the opposing party provide an exception to the rule that

9. 1 JAMES W. MOORE & JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 13.03, at 696
(1938).
[The permissive counterclaim] is an independent and unrelated claim and needs
independent jurisdictional grounds to support it, with one exception. Set-off is
that exception. Certain matter that does not arise out of the transaction sued 6n
can nevertheless be used defensively for purposes of set-off; and. for purposes of
defeating or diminishing [the] plaintiff s recovery no independent jurisdictional
grounds would be needed therefore.
Id.; see also id. at n.17 ("No cases squarely in point have been found to support the text .....
10. See Marks v. Spitz, 4 F.R.D. 348, 350 (D. Mass. 1945). For cases applying the
defensive set-off exception, see also Curtis v. Caldwell, 86 F.R.D. 454, 457-58 (E.D. Pa.
1980); Binnick v. Avco Fin. Servs., 435 F. Supp. 359, 366 (D. Neb. 1977); Herrmann v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 72 F.R.D. 182, 185 (W.D. Pa. 1976); United States v. Thermo
Contracting Corp., 437 F. Supp. 195, 199 (D.N.J. 1976); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365
F. Supp. 1364, 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Sherburne Corp. v. Ohio Spring Specialities, Inc., 13
Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 100, 101 (N.D. Oh. 1969); and Fraser v. Astra Steamship Corp.,
18 F.R.D. 240, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). For cases noting the exception but finding it not
applicable, see United States v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077, 1081 n.1 (2d Cir.
1970); Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 715 (5th Cir.
1970); Barrett v. L.F.P., No. 85-C-6495, 1986 U.S. Dist. LExIs 23673, at *6 (N.D. I11.June 25,
1986); Olevares v. Viking Dodge, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 114, 115 (N.D. I11.1985); Jones v. Sonny
Gerber Auto Sales, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 695, 697 (D. Neb. 1976); Wigglesworth v. Teamsters Local
No. 592, 68 F.R.D. 609, 613 (E.D. Va. 1975); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v.
Ralston Steel Corp., 25 F.R.D. 23, 26 (N.D. Il1.1959); and Marks, 4 F.R.D. at 350. But see
Wolfson v. Artisans Say. Bank, 83 F.R.D. 549 (D. Del. 1979) (rejecting the defensive set-off
exception); Roberston Bros. & Co. v. Tygart Steel Prods. Co., 9 F.R.D. 468, 469 (W.D. Pa.
1949) (same).
1I. According to Professor Moore, a claim for set-off must be "liquidated andemerge from
a contract or judgment." 1 MOORE & FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, § 13.01, at 667 n. 1 (emphasis
added). A more accurate, simplified definition had been provided by Professor Clark 10 years
before. According to Clark, "it was necessary that the [set-oft] demands either be liquidated,
or arise out of contract or judgment." CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE
PLEADING 438 (1928) (emphasis added). In fact, the law of set-off was (and is) a complicated
subject which no single sentence can hope to capture. Several treatises were devoted to set-off
in the nineteenth century. See MONTAGUE, supranote 6; BARBOUR, supra note 7; WATERMAN,
supra note 7. Joseph Story devoted a chapter of his equity treatise to the subject. 2 STORY,
supra note 7, at 601-10. Modem definitions of set-off are varied and generally broader than
Professor Moore's. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1994) (set-off in bankruptcy); 28 U.S.C. §§
1503, 2508 (1994) (authorizing set-off in favor of the United States); George B. Fraser,
AncillaryJurisdictionand the JoinderofClaims in the FederalCourts, 33 F.R.D. 27, 32-33
(1964) (describing variations in set-off under state law).
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permissive counterclaims require an independent basis for jurisdiction."'" The
Wright and Miller treatise is similarly straightforward: "[P]ermissive
counterclaims, under Rule 13(b)... require independent jurisdictional grounds.
The only exception to this rule is when the permissive counterclaim takes the
form of a set-off, in which case ancillary jurisdiction will be available."' 3
What is the general rule to which defensive set-off is an exception, and where
does it come from? Narrowly stated, the rule is-or, before the 1990
supplemental-jurisdiction statute, was-that federal courts have ancillary
jurisdiction over compulsory but not permissive counterclaims. 4 The difference
in treatment resulted from the fact that a compulsory counterclaim "arises out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim" whereas a permissive counterclaim does not. 5 Indeed, in all instances
where ancillary jurisdiction was allowed, there was a consistent rule-based
requirement that the claim arise out of the same transaction as the claim for which
there was original jurisdiction-compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a), 6
crossclaims under Rule 13(g),' 7 impleaders under Rule 14," class actions under
Rule 23,'9 and interventions as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) prior to the 1966

12. 3 WAYNE D. BRAZIL ETAL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACE § 13.40, at 13-52 (3d ed.
1998).
13.13 CHARLESALAN WRIGHTETAL, FEDERALPRACTICEAND PROCEDURE § 3523, at 10809 (2d ed. 1984); see also 6 id. § 1422, at 175-76 (2d ed. 1990).
Some courts have indicated that a permissive counterclaim in the form of a set off,
if used defensively rather than as the basis for affirmative relief, does not need
independent jurisdictional grounds even though the claim is unconnected with the
transaction or occurrence on which the main claim is based. This attitude is
consistent with the treatment historically given to set offs.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
14. See Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1073 (2d Cir. 1977). Professor
Thomas E.Green argued forcefully that there should be ancillary jurisdiction over both
compulsory and permissive counterclaims in FederalJurisdictionover Counterclaims,48 Nw.

U.L. REv. 271 (1953), convincing Judge Friendly of the correctness of his position, see United
States v. Heyward-Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077, 1088 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring)
(citing to Professor Green).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaim "arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim"); see id. at 13(b) (stating
that a permissive counterclaim is "any claim... not arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim").
16. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609 (1926).
17. See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 617 n.14 (1966).
18. See West v. United States, 592 F.2d 487, 190-92 (8th Cir. 1979) (claims by the
defendant against a third-party defendant); Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co., 167 F.2d 841,
845 (3d Cir. 1948) (claims by the defendant against a third-party defendant); Revere Copper
& Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1970) (claim by a thirdparty defendant against the plaintiff).
19. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365-67 (1921) (unnamed
plaintiffs in a class action need not be of diverse citizenship). But cf Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (unnamed plaintiffs must satisfy the jurisdictional
amount). 28 U.S.C. § 1367 may have overruled Zahn. See In re Abbott Lab., 51 F.3d 524, 52627 (5th Cir. 1995).
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amendment to that rule.2" Thus, broadly stated, the general rule was that ancillary
jurisdiction required that a claim be transactionally related to the original claim.2'
Prior to United Mine Workers v. Gibbs in 1966, the requirement of a
transactional relationship was essentially a judge-made rule serving as a gloss on
the federal district courts' jurisdictional statutes. In Gibbs, the Court expanded
pendent jurisdiction, rejecting the old Hum v. Ousler22 cause of action test as
"unnecessarily grudging."' According to Gibbs,
[p]endent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there
is a claim "arising under... [federal law]," and the relationship between that
claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before
the court comprises but one constitutional "case."... The state
24 and federal
claims must derive from a common nucleus of operativefact.
The "common nucleus" test of Gibbs is, of course, a transactional test, similar to
the non-constitutional test that had been employed as the "general rule" in
ancillary jurisdiction. After Gibbs, does the Constitution require a "common
nucleus of operative fact" for all claims for which there is no independent basis
for jurisdiction? If so, the "exception" to the general rule for defensive set-off
may be in serious jeopardy. It is one thing to be an exception to a judge-made
gloss on jurisdictional statutes, as it had been before Gibbs. It is quite another to
be an exception to the Constitution.
Two recent court of appeals decisions, both written by distinguished judges,
have directly addressed the defensive set-off exception.25 One unequivocally

20. See Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485, 491-92 (9th Cir. 1963). After
intervention of right was made more easily available in the 1966 amendment to Rule 23(a), it
was likely but not certain that ancillary jurisdiction was available for all interventions as of
right. See Curtis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 754 F.2d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1985). In an odd
anomaly, a would-be intervenor as of right who also would have been an indispensable party
under Rule 19 could not invoke ancillary jurisdiction. See Chance v. County Bd. of Sch.
Trustees, 332 F.2d 971, 973-74 (7th Cir. 1964). Under the new statute, there is supplemental
jurisdiction over claims brought by a defendant intervening as of right in a diversity case,
irrespective of what status he or she might have had under Rule 19. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b)
(1994). For discussion ofthese complications, see 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHTETAL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1917 (2d ed. 1986).
21. Note that a transactional relationship was a necessary but not sufficient condition for
ancillary jurisdiction. In several notable instances, ancillary and pendent party jurisdiction was
denied despite the presence of a transactional relation. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 1819 (1976) (no pendent-party jurisdiction over additional defendant); Owen Equip. & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978) (no ancillary jurisdiction over claim by plaintiff
against third-party defendant); Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (no pendentparty jurisdiction over additional defendant).
22. 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933) (sustaining federal judicial power to decide both state and
federal claims if both constitute separate grounds "in support of a single cause of action" for
redress of a violation of a "primary right" belonging to the plaintiff).
23. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
24. IAL (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2) (second emphasis and alteration added) (citation
omitted).
25. See also Wolfson v. Artisans Says. Bank, 83 F.R.D. 549, 551 (D. Del. 1979) (rejecting
the defensive set-off exception); Robinson Bros. & Co. v. Tygart Steel Prods. Co., 9 F.R.D.
468, 469 (W.D. Pa. 1949) (same).
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rejected the exception as inconsistent with Gibbs. The other was more
circumspect, but also appeared to disapprove. The first was Ambromovage v.
UnitedMine Workers,26 in which Judge Becker allowed a claim for defensive setoff, but only because it was transactionally related to the claim over which there
was jurisdiction.27 He wrote that the origins of the exception for unrelated claims
of defensive set-off are "not entirely clear"; indeed, it was "apparently invented
by Professor Moore."2" Because he believed that the "constitutional test is
whether a pendent or ancillary claim has a 'common nucleus of operative fact'
with the underlying federal claim," Judge Becker concluded that Moore's
exception could not survive Gibbs.29 The second was Channell v. Citicorp
National Services, Inc.,3° in which Judge Easterbrook allowed a claim for
defensive set-off, but only because it fell "within the outer boundary" of the new
supplemental-jurisdiction statute.3' In his view, the Constitution required a soft
version of the Gibbs "common nucleus" test: The new statute "has extended the
scope of supplemental jurisdiction... to the limits of Article III-which means
that '[a] loose factual connection between the claims' can be enough ....
For a number of reasons, Ambromovage and Channell are wrong. First, it is
unclear that the Court would itself apply the Gibbs "common nucleus" test to all
types of supplemental jurisdiction. In Aldinger v. Howard,33 in which pendent
party jurisdiction was denied, the Court declined to determine "whether there are
any 'principled' differences between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction; or, if
there are, what effect Gibbs had on such differences. 3 4 In Owen Equipment &
Erection Co. v. Kroger,35 in which ancillary jurisdiction was denied, the Court
wrote that Gibbs "delineated the constitutional limits of federal judicial power,"
but it only "assume[d] without deciding" that the court of appeals had been
correct in applying the Gibbs test to ancillary jurisdiction. 36 Finally, in Finley v.
UnitedStates,37 in which pendent party jurisdiction was denied, the Court again
"assume[d] without deciding" that the Gibbs test applied. 8 The Court in these
cases may have been hinting that the Gibbs-test was too generous, and that in a
later case it might find that a narrower rather than a broader constitutional test
applied in pendent party and ancillary jurisdiction cases. This is at least a
possible reading, for in all three cases the Court refused jurisdiction on statutory
grounds, making it unnecessary to use a narrower constitutional test than Gibbs

26. 726 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1984).
27. See id. at 992.
28. Id. at 988 & n.47.
29. See id. at 990.
30. 89 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1996).
31. Id. at 386.
32. Id. (quoting Ammermen v. Sween, 54 F.3d 423, 424 (7th Cir. 1995)) (alteration in
original). A number of lower courts have held that Gibbs requires only a "loose factual
connection." See, e.g., 13B WRIGHTETAL., supra note 13, § 3567.1, at 117 (citing cases).
33. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
34. Id. at 13.
35. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
36.Id.at371 & n.10.
37. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
38. Id. at 549.
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to reach that result. But the Court may have been hinting at nothing, telling us
simply that it has not decided whether the Gibbs test applies to all types of
supplemental jurisdiction.
Second, if the Gibbs test does apply to all types of supplemental jurisdiction,
it is almost certainly wrong as a matter of historical constitutional interpretation.
The Court's opinion relies on the term "case" in Article III, but it supplies no
evidence-and so far as I am aware there is none-that to the framers the terms
"case" and "controversy" meant only disputes involving transactionally related
claims. The Gibbs Court relies on the term "case," as was proper in analyzing
jurisdiction pendent to a federal claim, but supplemental jurisdiction in civil
disputes includes both "cases" (for example, cases arising under federal law) and
"controversies" (for example, controversies between citizens of diverse states).39
It is quite clear that civil cases and controversies in the then-contemporary
practice could involve adjudication of claims arising out of unrelated facts, both
unrelated
in English and American courts, as they did in entertaining
40
1700S.
early
the
in
beginning
set-off
defensive
for
counterclaims
Third, to define a case as involving only transactionally related claims would
also be wrong as a matter of current practice and usage. Modem federal and state
procedural rules for civil cases are filled with examples of unrelated claims that
are allowed, even encouraged, as part of the same litigation. For example, Federal
Rule 13(b) 41provides that a defendant may state as a permissive counterclaim any
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence
of the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; Rule 1442 allows a third-party
defendant to make any counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff that would
be available under Rule 13; and Rule 18(a)43 allows a party to join as many claims
as that party has against the opposing party without regard to whether they arise
out of the same transaction.
Finally, to use the Gibbs "common nucleus" test to limit the scope of
supplemental jurisdiction across the board would be to ignore the test's origin and
purpose. Gibbs was a pendent jurisdiction case, involving the assertion by a
plaintiff of an additional claim for which there was no independent basis for
jurisdiction. To apply a test developed in that setting to the whole range of
supplemental jurisdiction is to apply it in circumstances almost certainly not in
the contemplation of the Gibbs Court. Further, Gibbs abandoned the
"unnecessarily grudging" Hum v. Ousler test and substituted the more generous
and expansive "common nucleus" test. 44 It would be ironic if a liberalizing test,

39. I regard the most likely explanation of the contemporary distinction between the terms
"case" and "controversy" to be that stated by St. George Tucker in his edition of Blackstone:
"Case" comprises criminal and civil disputes, whereas "controversy" comprises only civil

disputes. I ST. GEORGE TUCKER,

BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES,

app. E at 420-21 (1803); see

also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 431-32 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting); 3
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ONTHE CONSTTUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 536 n.2

40. See supratext accompanying note 7.
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
44. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1996).

(1833).
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designed to produce procedural fairness and judicial efficiency, 4 were applied
restrictively in later cases to defeat that very enterprise.46
The Court may choose to preserve the Gibbs test in pendent jurisdiction cases
for reasons of stare decisis, but there is little warrant to apply it to all of
supplemental jurisdiction. Defensive set-off is thus not an exception to a general
constitutional rule, for there is no such-or at least should be no such-general
rule. It might be objected that if the Gibbs "common nucleus" test does not set the
outer constitutional limit of supplemental jurisdiction, there is no stopping place.
Judge Friendly saw a variation of this objection in United States v. HeywardRobinson Co. 4 7 when he wrote that the "exception" for defensive set-off "carries
[with it] the seeds of destruction of the supposed general rule."4 But, of course,
there would be a constitutional stopping place. It just would not be the "common
nucleus" stopping place provided by the Gibbs test.
It would be a comprehensible constitutional test to allow supplemental
jurisdiction to extend no further than to whatever could have been tried in a single
judicial proceeding at the time of the Constitution's adoption. Such a test would
allow supplemental jurisdiction over defensive set-off claims arising out of
unrelated facts, but it would limit the federal courts to joinder devices available
at the time of the Constitution's framing. Or, if the Court is inclined to adapt
Article III to the conditions of modem litigation, a broader constitutional test
could permit supplemental jurisdiction over whatever can be tried as part of a
single judicial proceeding under modem joinder rules. Indeed, with some creative
work by the Court, language from Gibbs itself could support such an approach,
for immediately after stating the "common nucleus" test, the Court went on: "But
if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's
claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one

45. See id. at 726 (stating that ajustification for pendent jurisdiction "lies in considerations
of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants"); Consolo v. Fed. Maritime
Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 617 n.14 (1966) (noting that "considerations ofjudicial economy and
fairness to all the parties lie behind the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction").
46. This would not be the first time that what was originally a more generous Article III
standard has later been used as a restrictive standard. In Association ofDataProcessingService
Organizationsv. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), the Supreme Court granted standing more
generously than in previous cases, stating for the first time that Article III required a plaintiff
to have "injury in fact." Id. at 152-53. Though the "injury in fact" standard was intended by the
Court in Data Processingto be a basis for granting standing more generously, it has recently
been the basis for an Article III denial of standing to plaintiffs acting as private attorneys
general. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see also William A.
Fletcher, The Structureof Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221,229-31 (1988) (calling the "injury in
fact" requirement a "singularly unhelpful, even incoherent, addition to the law of standing");
Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," andArticle 111,
91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992) (discussing standing in general).
47. 430 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 1088.
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judicialproceeding,then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is
power in federal courts to hear the whole."49
If the constitutional test is too generous, allowing supplemental jurisdiction
where it should not exist, we may look to Congress. Indeed, we must look to
Congress, for it is only by virtue of an affirmative statutory grant ofjurisdiction
that the lower federal courts ever have subject matter jurisdiction. This is, of
course, bedrock principle. To establish the actual-as distinct from the
constitutionally available-scope of supplemental jurisdiction, we may either
look to the federal courts to construe general jurisdictional statutes, as they did
for many years, or to Congress to pass a statute specifically regulating
supplemental jurisdiction, as it did in 1990.
The present statute provides, subject to certain exceptions for diversity cases,
that federal district courts "shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution.""0 If the Gibbs "common nucleus" test is not the test of what
constitutes a case or controversy under Article III, a claim for defensive set-off
arising out of unrelated facts falls within the supplemental jurisdiction of the
federal courts, in both federal question and diversity cases. That is the easy part,
for few people will object on grounds of policy to defensive set-off. The hard part
is that many other transactionally unrelated claims may also be within the
constitutionally permissible supplemental jurisdiction. If that extends
supplemental jurisdiction too far, there is of course a solution-Congress may
amend the statute.

49. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 (emphasis added). There has been much discussion in the
literature of the relationship between this sentence of Gibbs and the preceding "common
nucleus" language. See, e.g., Matasar, supra note 4, at 1458-63; 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 13, § 3567.1, at 114.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994).

